Case Facts
In New Glarus, Wisconsin, the school district brought complain to the court over the refusal of Amish families in the county for not sending their older children to school. Wisconsin, like many states, had a compulsory education law in effect which mandated that children attend public or private schools until the age of sixteen. The families responded with two claims: 1. they did not want their children to be uneducated and 2. education was continuing at home so the state had no compelling interest to force the children to attend public or private schools. However, the state of Wisconsin contended that this case was similar to Prince v. Massachusetts where the Court upheld child labor regulations. Wisconsin contended that these laws were similar because they both dealt with the welfare of children.
Legal Question
Do the Compulsory Education laws of Wisconsin violate the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment?
Ruling
Yes. In a 6-1 decision, the Court ruled in favor of Yoder.
Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion and he begins his analysis by discussing how compulsory education laws violate Amish religious beliefs. He writes, "Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressures to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally." The Amish have no problem with compulsory elementary education, but they believe it is during the time of higher education when children begin to develop values.
Burger continues with an acknowledgment of the state's power to "impose reasonable regulations" for basic education, but also highlights that this power is not unlimited. In order for Wisconsin to justify compulsory education against a claim that it interferes with religious belief, it must either prove that 1.) the mandate does not interfere with the free exercise of religion or 2.) the state interest is so great that it overrides the free exercise claim. This is Sherbert in action, and Burger finds that the state has met neither requirement to uphold the compulsory education law.
Burger justifies this decision in a few key ways. First, he finds overwhelming evidence in the quality of the claims put forth by the Amish. "The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction." In other words, this claim is not one that rests on secular concerns, but one that is backed purely by religious beliefs. Forcing Amish children to attend public school would undoubtedly interfere with religious development.
In response to state claims, Burger is quite dismissive. The state argues that the free exercise claim is void because education is extremely important for the creation of citizens who will protect democracy and for teaching children to be self-reliant. The Court argues that the extra two years of school that this law deals with would do little in place of the informal education that Amish children receive after elementary education. Moreover, the record shows that the Amish community has been a successful unit in society. In this case, there is no demonstration that the children are being subjected to any physical, mental, or social harm by not attending the last two years of school. The state lacks a compelling interest and therefore the law is void.
An interesting dissent comes out of this case from Justice Douglas. He agrees with the approach overall, but believes that the Court is only protecting the parent's interests in this case. "Where the child is mature enough to express potential conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views..." Ultimately, Douglas desires a situation where if the child desires to attend high school, the state should be able to override the religious motivations of the parents.
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
From Cantwell, we received the Valid Secular Policy Test; meaning that as long as the government had a secular policy in mind, they were free to limit religious freedom. This played out in quite a few cases following Cantwell. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld laws mandating the saluting of the US flag because it had the secular goal of fostering patriotism. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled that state law prohibiting children from distributing/selling literature (papers, pamphlets, magazines, etc) supercedes the free exercise clause. This was based on the secular policy that the state has an interest in protecting children. However, this became a bit more complicated in the 1960s when decisions began to contradict the existing rule. In the 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown, Chief Justice Warren upheld "blue laws," which closed locations not offering essential goods and services on Sundays. In the opinion, Warren wrote, "if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law... to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid... unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." Now, I bolded that for a reason because the decision upholds the Valid Secular Policy test, but adds to it. Warren believed that the "blue laws" had a valid secular policy; they fostered a day of rest for the entire community. Moreover, there was no less restrictive achieving this policy. What did this mean for the Valid Secular Policy Test? Were the requirements for laws different, or was Braunfield a mistake that needed to be overturned?
Case Facts
Adell Sherbert worked at a textile mill in South Carolina, Monday through Friday. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which held that no work should be done between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. On June 5, 1959, Sherbert's employer informed her that Saturdays would now be a mandatory work day. Sherbert was fired after missing six Saturdays. Filing for unemployment, Sherbert was denied because she "failed to accept... without good cause... to accept available work when offered." Her religion did not justify her refusal to work. After losing in both the state trial and supreme Courts, Sherbert appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that the state's denial of benefits was legislating her beliefs. Moreover, she wanted a review of what constituted belief and what constituted action. The state countered that it had a valid secular policy of encouraging employment and discouraging fraud.
Legal Question
May a state deny unemployment benefits to a person whose religious beliefs hinders their acceptance of employment?
Ruling
No. In a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Sherbert.
Brennan decides the validity of the denial of benefits on two issues. First, does the denial of benefits place a burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion? Second, is there a compelling state interest that justifies such a burden?
In regard to the first issue, the Court finds that there clearly is a burden placed on Sherbert's free exercise. While the statute in question does not force Sherbert to work a six-day week through criminal sanctions, the statute does force her to make a decision between following her religion and receiving benefits. Sherbert is not being punished directly for her religion, but forcing the choice carries the same weight as a fine imposed on her as if it was a criminal case.
So, the state is placing a burden on Sherbert's free exercise, but as we saw in Cantwell, the state may place that burden if it serves a compelling secular state interest. In Sherbert, the state asserted that the law barring Sherbert from receiving benefits was in place to prevent fraudulent claims. However, the Court responded that it found no proof that this was a reasonable justification. Furthermore, Brennan adds that it would be the responsibility of the state to "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights..."
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this case is that it upholds Braunfield. As mentioned earlier, Braunfield held that Sunday blue laws were Constitutional because they provided a uniform day of rest for the community. Brennan writes that if the state was forced to make any exceptions in that case, the entire scheme would be unworkable. Yet, "in the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court."
It should be noted that two justices (Douglas and Stewart) wrote concurrences criticizing the the upholding of Braunfield. The dissenting opinion (Harlan and White) similarly make the same judgement.
The biggest change coming out of this case is the necessity of the government to prove that it is serving a compelling interest in the LEAST RESTRICTIVE way possible. This departs from Cantwell, which only asked the state to provide a compelling ineterest. Now, the state must essentially demonstrate that it is doing all it can not to infringe on First Amendment rights. To see how this is applied, we will next turn to the case Wisconsin v. Yoder.
Case Facts
Adell Sherbert worked at a textile mill in South Carolina, Monday through Friday. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which held that no work should be done between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. On June 5, 1959, Sherbert's employer informed her that Saturdays would now be a mandatory work day. Sherbert was fired after missing six Saturdays. Filing for unemployment, Sherbert was denied because she "failed to accept... without good cause... to accept available work when offered." Her religion did not justify her refusal to work. After losing in both the state trial and supreme Courts, Sherbert appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that the state's denial of benefits was legislating her beliefs. Moreover, she wanted a review of what constituted belief and what constituted action. The state countered that it had a valid secular policy of encouraging employment and discouraging fraud.
Legal Question
May a state deny unemployment benefits to a person whose religious beliefs hinders their acceptance of employment?
Ruling
No. In a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Sherbert.
Brennan decides the validity of the denial of benefits on two issues. First, does the denial of benefits place a burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion? Second, is there a compelling state interest that justifies such a burden?
In regard to the first issue, the Court finds that there clearly is a burden placed on Sherbert's free exercise. While the statute in question does not force Sherbert to work a six-day week through criminal sanctions, the statute does force her to make a decision between following her religion and receiving benefits. Sherbert is not being punished directly for her religion, but forcing the choice carries the same weight as a fine imposed on her as if it was a criminal case.
So, the state is placing a burden on Sherbert's free exercise, but as we saw in Cantwell, the state may place that burden if it serves a compelling secular state interest. In Sherbert, the state asserted that the law barring Sherbert from receiving benefits was in place to prevent fraudulent claims. However, the Court responded that it found no proof that this was a reasonable justification. Furthermore, Brennan adds that it would be the responsibility of the state to "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights..."
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this case is that it upholds Braunfield. As mentioned earlier, Braunfield held that Sunday blue laws were Constitutional because they provided a uniform day of rest for the community. Brennan writes that if the state was forced to make any exceptions in that case, the entire scheme would be unworkable. Yet, "in the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court."
It should be noted that two justices (Douglas and Stewart) wrote concurrences criticizing the the upholding of Braunfield. The dissenting opinion (Harlan and White) similarly make the same judgement.
The biggest change coming out of this case is the necessity of the government to prove that it is serving a compelling interest in the LEAST RESTRICTIVE way possible. This departs from Cantwell, which only asked the state to provide a compelling ineterest. Now, the state must essentially demonstrate that it is doing all it can not to infringe on First Amendment rights. To see how this is applied, we will next turn to the case Wisconsin v. Yoder.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
Alright, so after a long break we return to religion. Looking back at the Reynolds post, the Supreme Court set what we'll find to be an important rule in most free exercise cases: religious belief is unrestricted while action can be limited. Let's see how this plays out in the Cantwell nearly sixty years later.
Case Facts
Newton Cantwell and his two sons were distributing pamphlets and playing records to citizens in New Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were Jehovah's Witnesses and some citizens took their messages as being anti-Catholic. The authorities were contacted and the Cantwells were charged with the violation of a state law that made it illegal to solicit for money without a license. This license was to be issued by the state's secretary of the Public Welfare Council. He would determine if a cause was genuinelly religious or a cause for charity. If the situation was deemed neither of these two things, he could withold the necessary license. The law mentioned nothing of religion (it was neutral), but the Cantwells charged that it violated their free exercise of religion.
Legal Question
Did the Solicitation Law violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?
Ruling
Yes. In a unanimous decision the Court ruled that the Connecticut law lays a "forbidden burden" on the free exercise clause.
The opinion, written by Owen Roberts, touches on some important points. First, this case incorporates the free exercise clause on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He goes on to declare the free exercise is important in two ways. It protects the freedom of concience to believe in a certain religion and safeguards the free exercise of that religion. However, Roberts writes, "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." He faithfully held to the rule set down in Reynolds.
However, Roberts additionally makes an important and necessary distinction. He writes that restrictions on religion must not unduly infringe on protected freedoms. Meaning that lawmakers are not free to arbitrarily regulate religious action. The regulation must still strive to protect religious freedom. Roberts offers that a regulation that completely banned the spread of religious views would certainly violate the free exercise clause.
So what is the problem with the Connecticut law? Roberts acknowledges the state's interest in preventing fraud by requiring licenses for soliciting money. The regulation involves no religious test and has a legitimate purpose for society at large. The Court finds no problems in the Constitutionality of these issues. The conflict arises from the requirement that the secretary of the Public Welfare Council decide what is and what is not a religion. It is the determination made by the state as to what is a religion that violates the free exercise clause. It should be noted that the Court does not say that the state has no recourse to fight fraud, highlighting the penal code. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the state has power to dictate the time, place, and manner of solicitation in "the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience."
The end result of Cantwell is first that Reynolds is upheld. Belief cannot be restricted, but action certainly may. In addition, Cantwell establishes what is referred to as the VALID SECULAR POLICY TEST. The lynchpin being that as long as the government can justify the existence of a law with a secular policy, and the law is not targeted at a certain religion, the Court will uphold it.
Next time I'm planning on looking at Sherbert v. Verner, where we will surely learn that the test set down in Cantwell will not apply neatly to every case that comes to the Court. Adios.
Eric
Case Facts
Newton Cantwell and his two sons were distributing pamphlets and playing records to citizens in New Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were Jehovah's Witnesses and some citizens took their messages as being anti-Catholic. The authorities were contacted and the Cantwells were charged with the violation of a state law that made it illegal to solicit for money without a license. This license was to be issued by the state's secretary of the Public Welfare Council. He would determine if a cause was genuinelly religious or a cause for charity. If the situation was deemed neither of these two things, he could withold the necessary license. The law mentioned nothing of religion (it was neutral), but the Cantwells charged that it violated their free exercise of religion.
Legal Question
Did the Solicitation Law violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?
Ruling
Yes. In a unanimous decision the Court ruled that the Connecticut law lays a "forbidden burden" on the free exercise clause.
The opinion, written by Owen Roberts, touches on some important points. First, this case incorporates the free exercise clause on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He goes on to declare the free exercise is important in two ways. It protects the freedom of concience to believe in a certain religion and safeguards the free exercise of that religion. However, Roberts writes, "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." He faithfully held to the rule set down in Reynolds.
However, Roberts additionally makes an important and necessary distinction. He writes that restrictions on religion must not unduly infringe on protected freedoms. Meaning that lawmakers are not free to arbitrarily regulate religious action. The regulation must still strive to protect religious freedom. Roberts offers that a regulation that completely banned the spread of religious views would certainly violate the free exercise clause.
So what is the problem with the Connecticut law? Roberts acknowledges the state's interest in preventing fraud by requiring licenses for soliciting money. The regulation involves no religious test and has a legitimate purpose for society at large. The Court finds no problems in the Constitutionality of these issues. The conflict arises from the requirement that the secretary of the Public Welfare Council decide what is and what is not a religion. It is the determination made by the state as to what is a religion that violates the free exercise clause. It should be noted that the Court does not say that the state has no recourse to fight fraud, highlighting the penal code. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the state has power to dictate the time, place, and manner of solicitation in "the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience."
The end result of Cantwell is first that Reynolds is upheld. Belief cannot be restricted, but action certainly may. In addition, Cantwell establishes what is referred to as the VALID SECULAR POLICY TEST. The lynchpin being that as long as the government can justify the existence of a law with a secular policy, and the law is not targeted at a certain religion, the Court will uphold it.
Next time I'm planning on looking at Sherbert v. Verner, where we will surely learn that the test set down in Cantwell will not apply neatly to every case that comes to the Court. Adios.
Eric
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