Picking up where we left off, the stage was set for the most important case to ever hit the Supreme Court. Ultimately, Marbury v. Madison facilitates the creation of judicial review (the authority of federal judges to declare laws unconstitutional and therefore void). However, there was a lot more to the case than judicial review. In fact, a majority of it has little to judicial review, but deals with the practicalities of the case. In part 2, we'll be covering what the Supreme Court said about everything else in this case EXCEPT judicial review. Judicial review is not particularly difficult to understand, but it definitely deserves its own section and would certainly be under valued if tacked on with the rest of the case. Game on.
To begin, it should be made clear that the majority opinion in this case was written by the Chief Justice, John Marshall, and was decided in a unanimous vote (4-0). In the opinion, Marshall laid out FOUR main questions that deserved attention:
I. Does Marbury have a legal right to the commission appointing him to the Justice of the Peace position?
II. If he has the right, does the law provide remedy?
III. Is a writ of mandamus a proper/ available source of remedy in this case?
IV. May such a writ of mandamus be issued from the Supreme Court in this case?
I. In deciding this issue, Marshall looked specifically at the president's appointment power in the U.S. Constitution. A federal appointment is made SOLELY by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. After this takes place, a commission is created, signed by the president, and then the secretary of state affixes the seal of the presidency and delivers the commission. In the opinion of the Court, the signing of the commission is the final act in the appointment. To argue that the delivery of the commission is necessary to give Marbury the position would insinuate the the delivery is a necessary part of the appointment process. It is not. Marshall makes it clear that once the seal of the president is on the appointment, the process is finished and the executive has finished his or her role in the process. After the appointment is made, the president no longer has power over the office. Therefore, according to the Court, Jefferson would have no power in the appointment of Marbury. Witholding the commission violates the law.
II. The next question is one that Marshall touches on simply to make a point about the United States and the law. He writes:
"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."
He basically states that the U.S. has laws and it would be stupid if there was no way to enforce them.
III. For this issue, Marshall finds a writ of mandamus to be a perfectly fine option for the situation. He does preface the issue with the claim that it would not be applicable in all cases. For instance, some duties performed by the executive branch are political in nature (they are performed at the discretion of the president) and the Court would have no authority to dictate how the executive would carry out those duties. However, there are other duties that are specifically directed by law, and this falls into the judicial branch sphere of influence.
IV. This is the final issue and is designated as the issue that gave us judicial review. To simplify what was written above, the question that needs answering is:
Is the Supreme Court the correct place to find remedy for obtaining the appointment?
This case began in the Supreme Court (ORIGINAL JURISDICTION). Marbury relied on a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which allowed a person to begin a case in the Supreme Court if he or she sought to obtain a writ of mandamus against a person holding office in the United States. Madison was the secretary of state, so he was obviously a person holding federal office. Marshall agreed with Marbury on this issue, but went on to use judicial review on the Judiciary Act of 1789. In other words, Marbury had accurately understood the Congressional Act, but Congress had violated the Constitution in the passage of that act and therefore Marbury cannot seek remedy from the Supreme Court.
This was only the tip of the iceberg in discussing the fourth point, but I will come back to it adequately in the next post.
No comments:
Post a Comment