Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)

Alright, so after a long break we return to religion. Looking back at the Reynolds post, the Supreme Court set what we'll find to be an important rule in most free exercise cases: religious belief is unrestricted while action can be limited. Let's see how this plays out in the Cantwell nearly sixty years later.

Case Facts
Newton Cantwell and his two sons were distributing pamphlets and playing records to citizens in New Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were Jehovah's Witnesses and some citizens took their messages as being anti-Catholic. The authorities were contacted and the Cantwells were charged with the violation of a state law that made it illegal to solicit for money without a license. This license was to be issued by the state's secretary of the Public Welfare Council. He would determine if a cause was genuinelly religious or a cause for charity. If the situation was deemed neither of these two things, he could withold the necessary license. The law mentioned nothing of religion (it was neutral), but the Cantwells charged that it violated their free exercise of religion.

Legal Question
Did the Solicitation Law violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?

Ruling
Yes. In a unanimous decision the Court ruled that the Connecticut law lays a "forbidden burden" on the free exercise clause.

The opinion, written by Owen Roberts, touches on some important points. First, this case incorporates the free exercise clause on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He goes on to declare the free exercise is important in two ways. It protects the freedom of concience to believe in a certain religion and safeguards the free exercise of that religion. However, Roberts writes, "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." He faithfully held to the rule set down in Reynolds.

However, Roberts additionally makes an important and necessary distinction. He writes that restrictions on religion must not unduly infringe on protected freedoms. Meaning that lawmakers are not free to arbitrarily regulate religious action. The regulation must still strive to protect religious freedom. Roberts offers that a regulation that completely banned the spread of religious views would certainly violate the free exercise clause.

So what is the problem with the Connecticut law? Roberts acknowledges the state's interest in preventing fraud by requiring licenses for soliciting money. The regulation involves no religious test and has a legitimate purpose for society at large. The Court finds no problems in the Constitutionality of these issues. The conflict arises from the requirement that the secretary of the Public Welfare Council decide what is and what is not a religion. It is the determination made by the state as to what is a religion that violates the free exercise clause. It should be noted that the Court does not say that the state has no recourse to fight fraud, highlighting the penal code. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the state has power to dictate the time, place, and manner of solicitation in "the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience."

The end result of Cantwell is first that Reynolds is upheld. Belief cannot be restricted, but action certainly may. In addition, Cantwell establishes what is referred to as the VALID SECULAR POLICY TEST. The lynchpin being that as long as the government can justify the existence of a law with a secular policy, and the law is not targeted at a certain religion, the Court will uphold it.

Next time I'm planning on looking at Sherbert v. Verner, where we will surely learn that the test set down in Cantwell will not apply neatly to every case that comes to the Court. Adios.

Eric