From Cantwell, we received the Valid Secular Policy Test; meaning that as long as the government had a secular policy in mind, they were free to limit religious freedom. This played out in quite a few cases following Cantwell. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld laws mandating the saluting of the US flag because it had the secular goal of fostering patriotism. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled that state law prohibiting children from distributing/selling literature (papers, pamphlets, magazines, etc) supercedes the free exercise clause. This was based on the secular policy that the state has an interest in protecting children. However, this became a bit more complicated in the 1960s when decisions began to contradict the existing rule. In the 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown, Chief Justice Warren upheld "blue laws," which closed locations not offering essential goods and services on Sundays. In the opinion, Warren wrote, "if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law... to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid... unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." Now, I bolded that for a reason because the decision upholds the Valid Secular Policy test, but adds to it. Warren believed that the "blue laws" had a valid secular policy; they fostered a day of rest for the entire community. Moreover, there was no less restrictive achieving this policy. What did this mean for the Valid Secular Policy Test? Were the requirements for laws different, or was Braunfield a mistake that needed to be overturned?
Case Facts
Adell Sherbert worked at a textile mill in South Carolina, Monday through Friday. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which held that no work should be done between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. On June 5, 1959, Sherbert's employer informed her that Saturdays would now be a mandatory work day. Sherbert was fired after missing six Saturdays. Filing for unemployment, Sherbert was denied because she "failed to accept... without good cause... to accept available work when offered." Her religion did not justify her refusal to work. After losing in both the state trial and supreme Courts, Sherbert appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that the state's denial of benefits was legislating her beliefs. Moreover, she wanted a review of what constituted belief and what constituted action. The state countered that it had a valid secular policy of encouraging employment and discouraging fraud.
Legal Question
May a state deny unemployment benefits to a person whose religious beliefs hinders their acceptance of employment?
Ruling
No. In a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Sherbert.
Brennan decides the validity of the denial of benefits on two issues. First, does the denial of benefits place a burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion? Second, is there a compelling state interest that justifies such a burden?
In regard to the first issue, the Court finds that there clearly is a burden placed on Sherbert's free exercise. While the statute in question does not force Sherbert to work a six-day week through criminal sanctions, the statute does force her to make a decision between following her religion and receiving benefits. Sherbert is not being punished directly for her religion, but forcing the choice carries the same weight as a fine imposed on her as if it was a criminal case.
So, the state is placing a burden on Sherbert's free exercise, but as we saw in Cantwell, the state may place that burden if it serves a compelling secular state interest. In Sherbert, the state asserted that the law barring Sherbert from receiving benefits was in place to prevent fraudulent claims. However, the Court responded that it found no proof that this was a reasonable justification. Furthermore, Brennan adds that it would be the responsibility of the state to "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights..."
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this case is that it upholds Braunfield. As mentioned earlier, Braunfield held that Sunday blue laws were Constitutional because they provided a uniform day of rest for the community. Brennan writes that if the state was forced to make any exceptions in that case, the entire scheme would be unworkable. Yet, "in the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court."
It should be noted that two justices (Douglas and Stewart) wrote concurrences criticizing the the upholding of Braunfield. The dissenting opinion (Harlan and White) similarly make the same judgement.
The biggest change coming out of this case is the necessity of the government to prove that it is serving a compelling interest in the LEAST RESTRICTIVE way possible. This departs from Cantwell, which only asked the state to provide a compelling ineterest. Now, the state must essentially demonstrate that it is doing all it can not to infringe on First Amendment rights. To see how this is applied, we will next turn to the case Wisconsin v. Yoder.
No comments:
Post a Comment