Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Case Facts
In New Glarus, Wisconsin, the school district brought complain to the court over the refusal of Amish families in the county for not sending their older children to school. Wisconsin, like many states, had a compulsory education law in effect which mandated that children attend public or private schools until the age of sixteen. The families responded with two claims: 1. they did not want their children to be uneducated and 2. education was continuing at home so the state had no compelling interest to force the children to attend public or private schools. However, the state of Wisconsin contended that this case was similar to Prince v. Massachusetts where the Court upheld child labor regulations. Wisconsin contended that these laws were similar because they both dealt with the welfare of children.

Legal Question
Do the Compulsory Education laws of Wisconsin violate the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment?

Ruling
Yes. In a 6-1 decision, the Court ruled in favor of Yoder.

Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion and he begins his analysis by discussing how compulsory education laws violate Amish religious beliefs. He writes, "Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressures to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally." The Amish have no problem with compulsory elementary education, but they believe it is during the time of higher education when children begin to develop values.

Burger continues with an acknowledgment of the state's power to "impose reasonable regulations" for basic education, but also highlights that this power is not unlimited. In order for Wisconsin to justify compulsory education against a claim that it interferes with religious belief, it must either prove that 1.) the mandate does not interfere with the free exercise of religion or 2.) the state interest is so great that it overrides the free exercise claim. This is Sherbert in action, and Burger finds that the state has met neither requirement to uphold the compulsory education law.

Burger justifies this decision in a few key ways. First, he finds overwhelming evidence in the quality of the claims put forth by the Amish. "The traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction." In other words, this claim is not one that rests on secular concerns, but one that is backed purely by religious beliefs. Forcing Amish children to attend public school would undoubtedly interfere with religious development.

In response to state claims, Burger is quite dismissive. The state argues that the free exercise claim is void because education is extremely important for the creation of citizens who will protect democracy and for teaching children to be self-reliant. The Court argues that the extra two years of school that this law deals with would do little in place of the informal education that Amish children receive after elementary education. Moreover, the record shows that the Amish community has been a successful unit in society. In this case, there is no demonstration that the children are being subjected to any physical, mental, or social harm by not attending the last two years of school. The state lacks a compelling interest and therefore the law is void.

An interesting dissent comes out of this case from Justice Douglas. He agrees with the approach overall, but believes that the Court is only protecting the parent's interests in this case. "Where the child is mature enough to express potential conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views..." Ultimately, Douglas desires a situation where if the child desires to attend high school, the state should be able to override the religious motivations of the parents.

Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)

From Cantwell, we received the Valid Secular Policy Test; meaning that as long as the government had a secular policy in mind, they were free to limit religious freedom. This played out in quite a few cases following Cantwell. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld laws mandating the saluting of the US flag because it had the secular goal of fostering patriotism. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled that state law prohibiting children from distributing/selling literature (papers, pamphlets, magazines, etc) supercedes the free exercise clause. This was based on the secular policy that the state has an interest in protecting children. However, this became a bit more complicated in the 1960s when decisions began to contradict the existing rule. In the 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown, Chief Justice Warren upheld "blue laws," which closed locations not offering essential goods and services on Sundays. In the opinion, Warren wrote, "if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law... to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid... unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." Now, I bolded that for a reason because the decision upholds the Valid Secular Policy test, but adds to it. Warren believed that the "blue laws" had a valid secular policy; they fostered a day of rest for the entire community. Moreover, there was no less restrictive achieving this policy. What did this mean for the Valid Secular Policy Test? Were the requirements for laws different, or was Braunfield a mistake that needed to be overturned?

Case Facts
Adell Sherbert worked at a textile mill in South Carolina, Monday through Friday. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which held that no work should be done between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. On June 5, 1959, Sherbert's employer informed her that Saturdays would now be a mandatory work day. Sherbert was fired after missing six Saturdays. Filing for unemployment, Sherbert was denied because she "failed to accept... without good cause... to accept available work when offered." Her religion did not justify her refusal to work. After losing in both the state trial and supreme Courts, Sherbert appealed to the US Supreme Court arguing that the state's denial of benefits was legislating her beliefs. Moreover, she wanted a review of what constituted belief and what constituted action. The state countered that it had a valid secular policy of encouraging employment and discouraging fraud.

Legal Question
May a state deny unemployment benefits to a person whose religious beliefs hinders their acceptance of employment?

Ruling
No. In a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Sherbert.

Brennan decides the validity of the denial of benefits on two issues. First, does the denial of benefits place a burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion? Second, is there a compelling state interest that justifies such a burden?

In regard to the first issue, the Court finds that there clearly is a burden placed on Sherbert's free exercise. While the statute in question does not force Sherbert to work a six-day week through criminal sanctions, the statute does force her to make a decision between following her religion and receiving benefits. Sherbert is not being punished directly for her religion, but forcing the choice carries the same weight as a fine imposed on her as if it was a criminal case.

So, the state is placing a burden on Sherbert's free exercise, but as we saw in Cantwell, the state may place that burden if it serves a compelling secular state interest. In Sherbert, the state asserted that the law barring Sherbert from receiving benefits was in place to prevent fraudulent claims. However, the Court responded that it found no proof that this was a reasonable justification. Furthermore, Brennan adds that it would be the responsibility of the state to "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights..."

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this case is that it upholds Braunfield. As mentioned earlier, Braunfield held that Sunday blue laws were Constitutional because they provided a uniform day of rest for the community. Brennan writes that if the state was forced to make any exceptions in that case, the entire scheme would be unworkable. Yet, "in the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court."

It should be noted that two justices (Douglas and Stewart) wrote concurrences criticizing the the upholding of Braunfield. The dissenting opinion (Harlan and White) similarly make the same judgement.

The biggest change coming out of this case is the necessity of the government to prove that it is serving a compelling interest in the LEAST RESTRICTIVE way possible. This departs from Cantwell, which only asked the state to provide a compelling ineterest. Now, the state must essentially demonstrate that it is doing all it can not to infringe on First Amendment rights. To see how this is applied, we will next turn to the case Wisconsin v. Yoder.

Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)

Alright, so after a long break we return to religion. Looking back at the Reynolds post, the Supreme Court set what we'll find to be an important rule in most free exercise cases: religious belief is unrestricted while action can be limited. Let's see how this plays out in the Cantwell nearly sixty years later.

Case Facts
Newton Cantwell and his two sons were distributing pamphlets and playing records to citizens in New Haven, Connecticut. The Cantwells were Jehovah's Witnesses and some citizens took their messages as being anti-Catholic. The authorities were contacted and the Cantwells were charged with the violation of a state law that made it illegal to solicit for money without a license. This license was to be issued by the state's secretary of the Public Welfare Council. He would determine if a cause was genuinelly religious or a cause for charity. If the situation was deemed neither of these two things, he could withold the necessary license. The law mentioned nothing of religion (it was neutral), but the Cantwells charged that it violated their free exercise of religion.

Legal Question
Did the Solicitation Law violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?

Ruling
Yes. In a unanimous decision the Court ruled that the Connecticut law lays a "forbidden burden" on the free exercise clause.

The opinion, written by Owen Roberts, touches on some important points. First, this case incorporates the free exercise clause on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He goes on to declare the free exercise is important in two ways. It protects the freedom of concience to believe in a certain religion and safeguards the free exercise of that religion. However, Roberts writes, "freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." He faithfully held to the rule set down in Reynolds.

However, Roberts additionally makes an important and necessary distinction. He writes that restrictions on religion must not unduly infringe on protected freedoms. Meaning that lawmakers are not free to arbitrarily regulate religious action. The regulation must still strive to protect religious freedom. Roberts offers that a regulation that completely banned the spread of religious views would certainly violate the free exercise clause.

So what is the problem with the Connecticut law? Roberts acknowledges the state's interest in preventing fraud by requiring licenses for soliciting money. The regulation involves no religious test and has a legitimate purpose for society at large. The Court finds no problems in the Constitutionality of these issues. The conflict arises from the requirement that the secretary of the Public Welfare Council decide what is and what is not a religion. It is the determination made by the state as to what is a religion that violates the free exercise clause. It should be noted that the Court does not say that the state has no recourse to fight fraud, highlighting the penal code. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the state has power to dictate the time, place, and manner of solicitation in "the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience."

The end result of Cantwell is first that Reynolds is upheld. Belief cannot be restricted, but action certainly may. In addition, Cantwell establishes what is referred to as the VALID SECULAR POLICY TEST. The lynchpin being that as long as the government can justify the existence of a law with a secular policy, and the law is not targeted at a certain religion, the Court will uphold it.

Next time I'm planning on looking at Sherbert v. Verner, where we will surely learn that the test set down in Cantwell will not apply neatly to every case that comes to the Court. Adios.

Eric

Sorry Sorry

I know I haven't posted in a while, but I am far from giving up on this blog. Recently I went camping in Tennessee. Upon my return, I found my hard drive had crashed and I just received my computer from the apple store yesterday night. In regards to my work involving the Supreme Court, I have been reading "All The Laws But One" by William Rhenquist. The book covers the state of civil rights/liberties during the Civil War and World War Two. I have less than 100 pages remaining and I am quite pleased with what I've read so far. I imagine a person could pick up the book on Amazon for a decent price. Talk to you later.

Eric

Battling over the Constitution

I have not posted for a while now, but for good reason. Recently, my free time has been taken up with a book by Richard Charques, "The Twilight of Imperial Russia." The book, originally published in 1958, recounts the decline of the Romanov dynasty and the monarchy in Russia. The book begins with the ascension of Nicholas II to the throne and ends with the rise of the Bolsheviks in 1917.

I don't want to get really preachy about this subject, but as I've been reading I came to the conclusion that we as Americans take the concept of a Constitution and limited power for granted. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, strikes and even revolution plagued Russia in an attempt to get Tsar Nicholas II to release any amount of power to a representative branch of government. On more than one occasion, these attempts were met with the shutting down of the duma by the tsar, arrests, and multiple attempts by the conservative members of society to rig the elections of the duma to produce a less rambunctious group of representatives. Needless to say, the tsar still exercised a pretty much unlimited amount of power within the country.

Meanwhile, the United States had been enjoying a government with limitations and separation of powers around one-hundred years. This is not to say that we didn't have any issues (Lincoln repealed habeas corpus in large areas during the Civil War). In any case, it is important to remember how lucky we are as citizens to have the rights that we do. If we don't like something the executive is doing, we have two other branches that we can complain to without worry about being exiled. I'm almost finished with this book. After that I'll pick up on some more religion cases. Thanks.

Eric

Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 (1878)

Reynolds is a very important case in the history of religious freedom. While the standards it set down have certainly seen revision over the past years, it was the first Supreme Court case that officially ruled that the free exercise of religion is not unlimited.

Case Facts
A Mormon follower, George Reynolds, married his second wife and was charged with violating a Congressional law applied to the Utah territory. Reynolds argued that he was following his faith and he was therefore protected under the free exercise clause.

Legal Question
Does the free exercise clause in the First Amendment protect polygamy?

Ruling
No. In a unanimous decision the Court ruled that while Congress may not legislate a person's opinion, Congress may legislate action.

Chief Justice Waite wrote the majority opinion and emphasized that the Constitution does not define religion. However, the Court suggests that we must look at the "history of the times in the midst of when the provision was adopted." Waite argues that when the First Amendment was passed, it was based on the notion that religion was a relationship solely between man and god. Legislative action reaches action, not opinion. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."

The Court then proceeds to demonize the practice of polygamy. Waite writes that it has always been seen as an unclean practice in the United States and the second marriage has always been void in the earliest recorded cases of English common law. In either case, the practice has been considered an offense against society. Furthermore, Waite calls attention to the fact that no state in the union has ever sanctioned polygamy, and therefore there is no way that the Constitution could possibly protect this behavior. He essentially established that if it was not an accepted religious practice when the Constitution was ratified, it does not enjoy the protection of the Constitution.

Ultimately, the Court states that the law passed by Congress is designed to maintain civility in the United States. "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?" In the end, the law is not subservient to religious belief.

Beginning Religion: Exercise and Establishment

Marbury v. Madison is the quintessential, if not cliche way to start any discussion about the Supreme Court and the cases that it has dealt with over the years. However, to its detriment, it is boring. No disrespect, but the honest truth is that the application to our everyday lives or even our everyday interests does not exist when reading the case (unless you are a Supreme Court fan like myself).

That is why I bring up what is hopefully the first of many Constitutional issues that will be discussed on this site: religion. I chose this because it is one of the more contentious issues that comes before the court. Religion plays and important role in our country whether people like it or not. It is often taught that the first settlers came to escape religious persecution. References to god exist on any number of government documents and in government buildings. If nothing else, religion permeates nearly every American life at some point. That is why I've chosen it to as the first of topics.

The Constitution actually only mentions religion once in Article VI.

"no religious Test shall every be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."

The subject of religion came up only briefly during the Constitution convention, but some delegates did criticize that the Constitution failed to protect the right to freely exercising religion. In response, the Bill of Rights included TWO provisions. The free exercise and establishment clauses. They read:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

A few points to leave you with are:
1. What is religion? What qualifies a belief as a religion that deserves protection?
2. How strict should the establishment clause be read? Is having the word "god" on the U.S. dollar an establishment of religion?

Marbury v. Madison 1 CR. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803) PART 3

Is the Supreme Court the appropriate place for Marbury to seek remedy?

Yes according to the Judiciary Act of 1789. No according to the Supreme Court and their interpretation of the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall was not only about to undertake judicial review, but also define and solidify its place the judicial branch.

Judicial Review: The authority of federal courts to declare a law unconstitutional and therefore void.

While that may sound a bit confusing, it is really quite simple. Think of it like this:

In this country, we must obey the law (rules). If we don't (like we steal a Nintendo Wii), we go see a judge and then he throws you in jail. Judicial review works in a similar way.

In this country, the laws past by Congress also need to follow the rules written in the Constitution. Similar to what happens to us, if a law breaks the rules, it also gets sent to the slammer. A judge examines the law and then decides if it violates what is written in the Constitution. If it does, he "strikes down" the law, and that law is gone.

In the opinion, Marshall is very practical about why this power should be exercised by the judicial branch. He writes:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the rule.

He essentially states that since courts are always dealing with situations where they need to understand the law (a trial), it makes sense that they would be the ones who would have the responsibility of interpreting the laws. Furthermore, he emphasizes that this power is necessary because the Constitution would be useless if there was no way to enforce its rules. Poof! Judicial review is born.

How is it applied in this case? Well, the problem is that the Judiciary Act of 1789 allows people to bring their case directly to the Supreme Court (specifically Marbury in this case), or in other words, the act allowed this case to originate in the Supreme Court (original jurisdiction). HOWEVER, Article III already specifies when the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over a case. Congress does not have the power to add new instances.

I understand this a bit confusing, so I would like to use an easier example. Think of the requirements for becoming president. The Constitution states that a person needs to be a citizen born in the United States and thirty-five years old. Those are the only two requirements and no law can be passed that adds to these requirements. It would be unconstitutional if they tried to make a law saying that a person also had to be from New York... or that they had to be thirty-six for that matter. Because the Constitution has already spoken on the issue, nothing can be added.

In this case, the Constitution already specifically lays out when the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. Therefore, Congress cannot add to that jurisdiction. That part of the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional and Marbury should not be in the Supreme Court for this case.

A few interesting points:
1. Chief Justice Marshall pulled a great coup in this case. He broadened the Supreme Court's power undoubtably against the wishes of President Jefferson. However, Marbury did not get the appointment, so Jefferson won the case in a practical sense and couldn't really complain.
2. The Court ruled that Marbury should have brought his case to a lower court first. However, for his particular issue, no lower court existed yet. He had no place to turn. He was screwed from the beginning.
3. Marbury never did get his commission. Yet, his name will forever be known because he didn't get it. Seems like a fair trade to me.

Marbury v. Madison 1 CR. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803) PART 2

Picking up where we left off, the stage was set for the most important case to ever hit the Supreme Court. Ultimately, Marbury v. Madison facilitates the creation of judicial review (the authority of federal judges to declare laws unconstitutional and therefore void). However, there was a lot more to the case than judicial review. In fact, a majority of it has little to judicial review, but deals with the practicalities of the case. In part 2, we'll be covering what the Supreme Court said about everything else in this case EXCEPT judicial review. Judicial review is not particularly difficult to understand, but it definitely deserves its own section and would certainly be under valued if tacked on with the rest of the case. Game on.

To begin, it should be made clear that the majority opinion in this case was written by the Chief Justice, John Marshall, and was decided in a unanimous vote (4-0). In the opinion, Marshall laid out FOUR main questions that deserved attention:
I. Does Marbury have a legal right to the commission appointing him to the Justice of the Peace position?
II. If he has the right, does the law provide remedy?
III. Is a writ of mandamus a proper/ available source of remedy in this case?
IV. May such a writ of mandamus be issued from the Supreme Court in this case?

I. In deciding this issue, Marshall looked specifically at the president's appointment power in the U.S. Constitution. A federal appointment is made SOLELY by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. After this takes place, a commission is created, signed by the president, and then the secretary of state affixes the seal of the presidency and delivers the commission. In the opinion of the Court, the signing of the commission is the final act in the appointment. To argue that the delivery of the commission is necessary to give Marbury the position would insinuate the the delivery is a necessary part of the appointment process. It is not. Marshall makes it clear that once the seal of the president is on the appointment, the process is finished and the executive has finished his or her role in the process. After the appointment is made, the president no longer has power over the office. Therefore, according to the Court, Jefferson would have no power in the appointment of Marbury. Witholding the commission violates the law.

II. The next question is one that Marshall touches on simply to make a point about the United States and the law. He writes:

"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."

He basically states that the U.S. has laws and it would be stupid if there was no way to enforce them.

III. For this issue, Marshall finds a writ of mandamus to be a perfectly fine option for the situation. He does preface the issue with the claim that it would not be applicable in all cases. For instance, some duties performed by the executive branch are political in nature (they are performed at the discretion of the president) and the Court would have no authority to dictate how the executive would carry out those duties. However, there are other duties that are specifically directed by law, and this falls into the judicial branch sphere of influence.

IV. This is the final issue and is designated as the issue that gave us judicial review. To simplify what was written above, the question that needs answering is:

Is the Supreme Court the correct place to find remedy for obtaining the appointment?

This case began in the Supreme Court (ORIGINAL JURISDICTION). Marbury relied on a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which allowed a person to begin a case in the Supreme Court if he or she sought to obtain a writ of mandamus against a person holding office in the United States. Madison was the secretary of state, so he was obviously a person holding federal office. Marshall agreed with Marbury on this issue, but went on to use judicial review on the Judiciary Act of 1789. In other words, Marbury had accurately understood the Congressional Act, but Congress had violated the Constitution in the passage of that act and therefore Marbury cannot seek remedy from the Supreme Court.

This was only the tip of the iceberg in discussing the fourth point, but I will come back to it adequately in the next post.

Marbury v. Madison 1 CR. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803) PART 1

So this is really the big one. The case that set up everything that the Supreme Court does today. Yet, it is striking how many people actually have no idea what happened in this case. To be fair, it was not a simple situation by any stretch. Furthermore, the big result (not to spoil it but JUDICIAL REVIEW) had very little to do with much of the historical background surrounding the case. So, I believe that this case requires a bit of finesse and therefore I am going to split it into three parts: 1) background, 2) the decision made by the Court, and 3) the creation of judicial review and what judicial review is. Let's begin.

BACKGROUND

The 1800 presidential election was between incumbent president John Adams (FEDERALIST: all power to the national government) and Thomas Jefferson (ANTIFEDERALIST: hurray states' rights). In short, Adams and the Federalists lost big; the presidency and both houses of Congress.

Whatever your political views may be, the departure of the Federalists was less than graceful. Following their loss of two branches of government, the Federalists made an effort to secure the one remaining branch. The Circuit Court Act, or "Midnight Judges Act," created six new circuit courts and created sixteen new positions to be appointed (all by the lame-duck Federalist president and Congress). Furthermore, the Federalist Congress also passed the Organic Act of 1801, which allowed Adams to appoint forty-two justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. The stage was now set for the most important case in the history of the Supreme Court.

Marbury (the one from the title) was one of the justices appointed by Adams at the end of his administration. Marbury was appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. However, his appointment was not delivered by the outgoing secretary of state (interestingly, John Marshall, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court). When Jefferson became president, he ordered his secretary of state, James Madison, not to deliver the undelivered commissions (including the one for Marbury).

In response, Marbury went to the Supreme Court and asked them to issue a (literally: we command) to Madison, ordering the new Secretary of State to deliver the appointments. Marbury was able to sue under a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that allowed the Court to issue writs of mandamus to anyone holding federal office.

Before closing this section, I'd like to point to the conflicted position of the new Chief Justice, John Marshall. As mentioned earlier, he was secretary of state under the former president John Adams and was now being asked to rule on the issue of an appointment made by Adams. The Federalists were looking to Marshall to rule on their side. However, Marshall was conscious of the danger in causing a fight with Jefferson and the Antifederalists (Jefferson and Congress were actually considering impeaching some of the federal judges including Marshall). The stage was set for what would become the most important case in the history of the Supreme Court.

BUSY

I've got an important interview this week so I don't plan on posting until either late Friday or early Saturday.

Eric

The Judiciary Act of 1789

The Judiciary Act of 1789 took the abstract rules laid out in Article III and created a system where they would actually be applicable. Remember, until this act was passed, neither the Supreme Court, nor any other federal court existed in the United States. The law is complicated, but in general it served two main purposes:

First, it was the Judiciary Act that established the federal court structure. The Constitution only mentions that the Supreme Court exists, but says nothing else. Congress, not the Constitution, determines the number of justices on the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Constitution only mentions the existence of federal courts, but none existed until the Judiciary Act was passed. It created district and circuit courts. District courts were presided over by one judge (which is still true today) and the circuit courts were made up of one district court judge and two Supreme Court justices (three judges would hear cases). Today, three judges still hear cases in circuit courts, but those judges are appointed by the president.

Second, the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the jurisdiction that each federal court would have. This part of the law gets a bit thick because it deals with the district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court. For our purposes, not much of it is important to cover in detail. However, one particularly significant portion, Section 25, allowed the Supreme Court to hear appeals from the highest state courts if those courts upheld a state law against a claim that the state law violated the US Constitution or US laws and/or treaties.

Ultimately, the Judiciary Act of 1789 is important because it established a court system that is very similar to the system we have today. Not only that, but it is a reminder that the Constitution does not dictate how the court system exists in the United States. Other that what is actually listed in the US Constitution, Congress holds all authority to determine what types of cases the Supreme Court and all federal Courts can hear.

The Supreme Court, Article III, and Sources of Authority

An obvious choice to begin any anything about the Supreme Court would certainly be Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). However, I feel that most overviews of the Supreme Court and its power are overlooked. Sure Marbury is a very important case (why?... it established the Supreme Court's ability to conduct judicial review.. uh doi), but it is equally important to look at what the Constitution says about the judicial branch in general and how we have progressed since the ratification in 1787.

Article III: The Judiciary
It may be interesting to know that the framers viewed the judiciary as the least dangerous branch upon creation. This was primarily because many of the framers were already comfortable with the role of the courts. The colonies and Great Britain already had firmly established court systems and many of the delegates had backgrounds in law. So, what did they actually put to paper back in the day?

Article III, Section 1 establishes the Supreme Court and the framework for the creation of further federal courts. The Supreme Court is permanent, but Congress has the power to create and eliminate lower federal tribunals. The final role of Section 1 is to provide judges with protection from their salary being lessened while they hold their position. While this may seem like an odd inclusion, the "compensation clause" stands as proof that the framers wished for the judiciary to be protected from legislative interference.

Section 2 is where things get a bit meatier (it should since it's the longest section in Article III). This section details the jurisdiction that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts (none of which existed yet) would have. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, original jurisdiction (cases that would begin in the Supreme Court) would occur only when a case involved an ambassador, public minister, or cases where a state was an involved party. However, the Supreme Court also has appellate jurisdiction (cases that begin in either state or lower federal courts, but are "appealed" and brought to the Supreme Court), but that jurisdiction is subjected to Congressional exceptions. Here, the framers created a check on the power of the courts by allowing Congress to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Finally, Section 3 has little to do with the Supreme Court in particular, but lays out the requirements for someone being charged with treason.

Conclusion
So that was the basic structure of the Supreme Court when the Constitution was ratified. It has evolved a long way since then and will continue to do so. Another small piece of interest is that federal courts are slightly affected by Article II. It is here that the president is granted the power to appoint federal judges with the "advice and consent" of the Senate (majority vote). A little fact, Supreme Court nominations are the most rejected nominations by the Senate. Well, that is the end of the first installment on SCOTUS Review. I plan to next tackle the Judiciary Act of 1789 and cover a little bit more of Congress' use of their ability to grant and strip federal court jurisdiction.

Eric Dietz

The beginning of SCOTUS Review

So the purpose of this blog is essentially to recap and explain the important Supreme Court Cases in U.S. history. I know that sounds like a daunting task, and I have no delusions of the difficulty that this entails. In fact, it is likely impossible to cover even the most important cases in history. However, this is a little project that I've been meaning to take on. I one day hope to make my way into law school or graduate school in the future and I feel that there is at least some merit in doing this. My goal is to update it two to three times a week and to one day start a podcast that follows a similar format. Anyone who is interested in writing for the blog is welcome if it is because they love law or if they are just interested in getting some practice in the areas of research and writing.